The Evolution of Multinational Corporate Investment in Argentina by Massey, Christine J.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
The changing face of Argentina Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1995
The Evolution of Multinational Corporate
Investment in Argentina
Christine J. Massey
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v13
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The changing face of Argentina by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact
preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Massey, Christine J., "The Evolution of Multinational Corporate Investment in Argentina" (1995). The changing face of Argentina. Paper
6.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v13/6
THE EVOLUTION OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE 
INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA 
Christine J. Massey 
Introduction 
In 1989, under the leadership of President 
Carlos Menem, Argentina began a miraculous 
recovery which completely transformed the 
country. Instead of continuing to discourage 
foreign investment by means of heavy govern-
ment regulation, Argentina became one of the 
most open economies for foreign investment in 
the world. Multinational corporations in partic-
ular have found numerous benefits from invest-
ing in the Argentine economy. Equal treatment 
for foreign corporations and deregulation have 
spurred a huge influx of foreign businesses to 
the country. In addition to looser restrictions, 
multinational corporations have found more 
opportunities awaiting them as the economic 
climate within Argentina constantly improves. 
In this essay I first provide a historical 
background of Argentine foreign investment 
policies before the reforms. Next I address the 
changes that have occurred and the reasoning 
behind the shifts in attitude towards foreign 
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investment. I follow with a description of some 
of the characteristics of the Argentine econo-
my which have made multinational corporate 
investment in Argentina so appealing. To 
demonstrate by example the benefits of invest-
ment in Argentina, I analyze the success of two 
major corporatio!ls, Whirlpool and Nabisco. 
Finally, I address the future of the multinational 
corporation in Argentina and the question of 
whether this growth and deregulation can be 
expected to last. 
Investment History before the 
Reforms 
The import substitution model, which is 
based upon the idea of strengthening one's own 
industries to replace the dependency on imports 
to achieve industrialization, became a popular 
model for many Latin American countries, 
including Argentina, after WWII. The 1930s and 
1940s were a trying time for these countries 
because of the decrease in foreign demand that 
occurred during these periods. By 1940 ship-
ments to and from Argentina had dropped to 
less than half the volume of a year earlier. 
Blockades that resulted from WWII generally 
limited the access that ships had to countries. 
In addition to the reduction in exports that 
resulted from blocked entry and lowered 
demand due to the war, imports also decreased. 
Countries like England, for example, were shift-
ing their resources to arms production and 
could no longer ship valuable resources to other 
countries. As a result, Argentina found itself in 
a difficult situation. Both imports and exports 
were at their lowest levels in years, and the coun-
try needed to find ways to decrease its reliance 
on foreign markets. Argentina, as well as the 
other Latin American countries, felt that it could 
use its rich resources and skilled labor to pro-
duce the same items that it was importing, help-
ing to put it on a more equal level with other 
industrialized countries. The import substitu-
tion model can be said to be the beginning of an 
anti-foreign sentiment that would continue in 
various degrees throughout Argentine history. 
Why Import Substitution? 
As demand for its products decreased 
abroad, Argentine companies needed to find 
new markets for their goods at home. In addi-
tion, as imports of manufactured goods 
increased, Argentina needed to find a way to 
produce the needed items at home. The coun-
try saw a need to become more self-reliant. One 
of the leading Argentine economists at the time, 
Raul Prebish, thought the way to achieve this 
goal of self-reliance was through the promotion 
of industrialization. Most Argentine exports 
were raw materials, such as grains, while its 
imports consisted mostly of manufactured 
goods. By erecting high barriers for foreign 
goods, Argentine companies could grow and 
learn to compete without the pressure of for-
eign competitors. The country would no longer 
need to rely on imports from other countries, 
as it would now have the capabilities to produce 
the needed items at home. 
Peron Economics 
Juan Peron was one of the first presidents 
44 
to discourage foreign investment and utilize the 
methods of import substitution. By 1955 under 
his nationalistic leadership private foreign invest-
ment declined to only three-fifths of what it was 
nine years earlier. (Rock, p. 263) Peron inter-
preted this drastic decline as signifying an end 
to the foreign control of Argentina's economy. 
He felt growth could be led inward: that 
Argentine companies could profit by manufac-
turing and selling goods for their own economy 
instead of relying on foreign demand. In addi-
tion to decreasing the economy's dependence on 
foreigners , Peron felt that industries would 
become naturally self-sufficient and productive. 
To further limit the excessive influence 
that Peron believed foreign countries had on 
Argentina's economy, Peron nationalized most 
of the foreign investments within the country. 
In the 1950s, Argentina had a substantial for-
eign exchange reserves surplus which was in 
the form of credits and essentially frozen as a 
result of the depressed economies that many 
countries suffered from as a result of the war. 
Fearing that Argentina would never see the 
money again, Peron sought to buy back many 
foreign investments with these credits. The 
majority of the investments which were repa-
triated were British, including the railroad sys-
tem which the Argentine government took 
over. Under Peron, virtually all foreign invest-
ments, with the exception of U.S. properties, 
were transferred to the ownership of the 
Argentine government. (Alexander, p. 67) 
Peron's methods to improve the economy 
were quite unsuccessful, however. Inflation was 
pervasive throughout the Peron administration. 
The annual inflation rate increased steadily from 
a 12.2 percent rise in 1947, to 13 percent in 
1948, to 32.7 percent in 1949. (Rock, p. 299). 
Stagnation was present throughout the econo-
my. In 1955 the per capita gross national prod-
uct was only 16 percent higher than it was in 
1943. Argentina no longer had the highest per 
capita income in Latin America, falling behind 
Venezuela in the early 1950s. Thus, while prices 
were rising, real wages fell approximately 20 per-
cent between 1948 and 1952. (Rock, p. 301) 
Peron tried to cover up the country 's 
problems by using state spending as a way to 
absorb the needed investment activities. For 
example, to make the economy seem as if it 
were growing, Peron increased the number of 
state employees. In fact, by 1955 10 percent of 
the working population was employed by the 
state. (Rock, p. 266) By increasing investment 
through state spending, Peron could mask the 
fact that industries were not growing and that 
the import substitution model was not suc-
cessful in expanding the economy. 
The government realized that access to 
new technologies, available mostly from multi-
national corporations, was a necessity if it want-
ed the country to become more industrialized. 
Between 1959 and 1973, lulled by inducements 
from the state, multinationals expanded into 
Argentina. (Rock, p. 328) However, many 
Argentines were wary of the actual benefits that 
the multinationals were perceived to provide 
for the country. Critics contended that multi-
nationals were expanding at a rate double that 
of the national companies, thus taking away 
market share from national companies. 
Furthermore, they alleged that much of the 
investment from multinationals came, in fact, 
from domestic savings, while only a quarter of 
actual investment came from abroad. (Rock, p. 
329) These companies were then also blamed 
for repatriating most of their profits to their 
home country, ignoring the investment needs 
of the Argentine economy. All of these factors 
helped to contribute to a growing feeling of dis-
content with the multinational corporations. 
The Foreign Investment Law of 
1973 
The Foreign Investment Law of 1973 gives 
the best picture as to the extent of the protec-
tionist sentiments. This law placed heavy 
restrictions on foreigners and generally made 
Argentina an undesirable country for foreign 
investment. The law forbade foreigners from 
purchasing more than fifty percent of any enter-
prise doing business in Argentina. In areas vital 
to national security, no foreign investment was 
allowed. To further augment the barriers 
against foreigners, the country placed heavy 
taxes on the foreigners and then limited profit 
remittances to 14 percent of net returns. 
(Lewis, p. 421) 
If a company still was not deterred by 
these considerable restrictions and decided to 
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enter the Argentine market, it would have sev-
eral other obstacles to overcome. Access to 
local banks was severely limited, so obtaining 
any needed funds would be quite difficult. In 
addition, all projects for new investment and 
expansion had to go through about 100 minor 
and mid-level functionaries before they passed 
to the cabinet for final review, resulting in about 
two years of red tape. (Lewis, p. 316) To keep 
companies from bringing in their own people, 
the Foreign Investment Law required 85 per-
cent of managerial and technical personnel to 
be Argentine. 
All of the rules and regulations made it 
quite difficult for any foreign company to be 
successful in Argentina. In fact, the Foreign 
Investment Law of 1973 created disadvantages 
deemed so insurmountable that there was no 
foreign investment for the next three years fol-
lowing the enactment of the law. (Lewis, p. 421) 
Changes in Attitude toward the 
International Investor 
During the late 1980s, the Argentine gov-
ernment began to realize that years of import 
substitution and barriers to foreign investment 
did little to help the economy grow. While it 
can be argued that import substitution did 
indeed help to encourage growth in the manu-
facturing sector, it is important to note that the 
ultimate goal for such growth was a desire to 
encourage the economic development of the 
country. In this sense, these policies were not 
successful. Argentina never came close to 
catching up with any of the developing coun-
tries. Per capita income was stagnant, inflation 
rates were enormous, and the manufacturing 
sector never became competitive with those of 
other countries. In fact, between 1977 and 1987 
industrial output declined 12.6 percent 
(Doggart, p. 49) 
The problem with heavily regulating foreign 
companies to give domestic firms an advantage is 
that the domestic advantage only lasts as long as 
the barriers are up. If the companies lack the 
necessities for competitive manufacturing, such 
as technological infrastructure, managerial know-
how and an entrepreneurial attitude, they will not 
be able to succeed once the barriers are lifted. To 
allow the barriers to remain and to rely solely on 
domestic manufacturing only hurts the economy 
since consumers will receive poorer quality goods 
at higher prices. For example, high tariffs for for-
eign countries allowed manufacturing industries 
to exist in Argentina even though the cost of pro-
duction for domestic companies was three to four 
times that of their foreign counterparts. 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, p. 262) 
Another problem with import substitution 
is that the domestic market usually is not large 
enough to support the development of its 
industries. Economies of scale often cannot be 
realized when producing for just one country. 
Because Argentina was so restrictive towards 
foreign investments, exporting to other coun-
tries was an impossibility since most countries 
would employ similar high tariff policies 
towards Argentine companies. As a result, 
manufacturing companies could not grow since 
their markets were limited. 
Thus , Argentina finally realized that it 
needed more than restrictive foreign policies to 
expand its economy. As the Argentines saw 
other countries developing at a faster rate and 
with better technologies, they saw a need to 
allow foreigners to come in and bring their 
ideas and experience from abroad. Most 
Argentine companies do not invest in research 
and development, and instead rely on the 
knowledge and expertise of foreign companies. 
(Bunge y Borne) It has been less costly to learn 
from foreigners by opening up the economy 
than to spend millions of dollars trying to cre-
ate methods which are already in use abroad. 
In fact, Argentine companies such as Molinas, 
a well known foodstuffs company, say they look 
forward to the entry of foreign companies such 
as Nabisco International, because they can learn 
from Nabisco new methods for their own man-
ufacturing processes. (Bunge y Borne) 
The Opening of the Argentine 
Economy 
Under the leadership of President Carlos 
Menem, the government initiated moves in 
1989 to make Argentina one of the world's most 
open economies. Most of the regulations of the 
past were eliminated. In its place were insti-
tuted policies which encouraged foreigners to 
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enter the Argentine markets. One of these 
changes involved the reduction of tariffs on 
imports. Until1988 the average tariff rate for 
imports was 39 percent, with some rates as high 
as 65 percent. These rates were lowered to an 
average of 20 percent, and the highest rates 
were pushed down to 30 percent. In addition, 
all export taxes were eliminated. Furthermore, 
Deregulation Decree 2284/91 abolished all 
quantitative restrictions on imports and 
exports. Before these changes, private capital 
flows were negative, with a deficit of $4.3 bil-
lion in 1989 and $769 million in 1990. After 
these changes, Argentina experienced positive 
capital inflows which amounted to $2.3 billion 
in 1991, $7.8 billion in 1992 and $5.1 billion in 
1993. (Republica Argentina ... ,1994, p. 45) 
Foreign corporations also no longer suf-
fered from regulations which unfairly favored 
domestic corporations. The Economic 
Emergency Law of 1989 placed foreign corpora-
tions on an equal footing with domestic compa-
nies. This law stated that there would be equal 
treatment for domestic and foreign capital invest-
ed in the country's productive processes as well 
as equal treatment towards the remittance of 
profits. Equal treatment meant that corporations 
enjoyed the benefits of not being taxed on divi-
dends and having to pay a corporate income tax 
of only 30 percent. (RepublicaArgentina ... ,1994, 
p. 36) Furthermore, the government abolished 
a measure which permitted foreign exchange 
repatriation only in the form of a Bonex, a 10 year 
government bond. Companies were now per-
mitted full repatriation of capital and profits 
through dividends and royalty investments. 
(Doggart, p. 22) Much of the red tape was also 
eliminated by abolishing the requirement that 
capital investments had to be approved by gov-
ernment officials. 
While the opening up of the economy did 
help to bring some foreign investment into 
Argentina, it has not been until the last few 
years that investment has shown a significant 
increase. This recent growth can be attributed 
to certain characteristics of the Argentine econ-
omy itself that have made Argentina an 
extremely profitable business opportunity. This 
will be covered in the next section. 
Favorable Conditions for the 
Multinational Corporation 
The greatest single contributor to the recent 
surge in foreign investment is simply the restora-
tion of confidence in foreign investors that the 
Argentine economy will remain stable. The coun-
try risk rate, which is used to measure the extra 
risk inherent in investing in a particular country, 
has decreased significantly over the last few years. 
In particular, the risk rate measures the political 
and economic stability of a country. Investors pay 
close attention to these rankings because they 
serve as an indicator of whether or not financial 
transactions and investments will be affected. 
(Gunter, p. 506) 
There are two rankings which are widely 
accepted by investors: the Euromoney Country 
Risk Rankings and the Institutional Investor 
Credit Rankings. In September 1991, Argentina 
scored only 34.9 of 100 possible points in the 
Euromoney analysis, placing it 78th in country 
rank. This ranking placed it just slightly ahead 
of such countries as Guatemala and Egypt. 
However, in September 1994 Argentina jumped 
to 49th place with a score of 56.18 points. 
Argentina's status also improved with the 
Institutional Investor rankings, jumping from 
78th place with only 20.2 points in 1991 to 58th 
place with 30.5 points. (Institutional Investor ... 
1991 and 1994) Improvements in its ranking can 
be attributed to a decrease in the country's debt 
in default, and an increase in access to capital 
markets and financing. These ratings show an 
increase in faith in economic and political sta-
bility in Argentina. 
Argentina can also attribute part of its 
decrease in risk ranking to investors' optimistic 
views of the country's new democracy. Before 
Menem the average term in office of government 
officials had been 29 months for the president and 
only 13 months for the minister of economy. 
(Arthur Andersen, p. 8) Investors were also enthu-
siastic that the main thrust of the Menem admin-
istration leaned towards privatization. Realizing 
that in the past the government had been waste-
ful and had extended control over too many indus-
tries, Menem sought to sell government owned 
corporations to the public to help balance the bud-
get and spur private investment. In this way, the 
new government was able to turn a continual bud-
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get deficit into a $175 million budget surplus after 
only its first year. (Doggart, p. 32) 
Another factor which has added to 
Argentina's newly perceived economic stability 
is the Convertibility Plan. In essence the 
Convertibility Plan is a set of legal measures 
which the government instituted in 1991 to help 
bring the country's hyperinflation under control. 
The exchange rate was fixed at parity with the 
U.S. dollar, and the country's monetary base was 
tied directly to gold or hard currency. Hence it 
became impossible for the government to 
finance its deficits through seignorage, the print-
ing of money. Because the Convertibility Plan 
has helped to stabilize the money supply, the 
inflation rate, which peaked at 4,900 percent in 
1989, has dropped to around 3 percent per year. 
This rate compares favorably with inflation rates 
in many developed countries. As a result of 
improvements such as these, significant 
amounts of capital have been returning to 
Argentina to take advantage of the investment 
opportunities that now abound. 
Argentina also possesses a competitive 
advantage in certain areas which makes it worth-
while for corporations to enter into its markets. 
It has an abundance of natural resources, rang-
ing from the fertile pampas region, to mining 
fields, forests, fish, and hydraulic resources. With 
twenty-five years of reserves, the country is com-
pletely self-sufficient in the gas sector. The coun-
try is also near self-sufficiency in oil, with nine 
years of reserves available. (Arthur Andersen, p. 
3) Thus a company which moves to Argentina 
will find that it does not have to face shortages of 
necessary resources. 
Demographic factors and the economy in 
general also contribute to the desirability of 
entering the Argentine markets. At an esti-
mated $6,494 per person, Argentina now has 
the highest per capita gross domestic product 
in Latin America. (Whirlpool) Between 1990 
and 1993, the economy grew at an incredible 
rate, making it the third fastest growing coun-
try for that time period. ("Open Market 
Changes ... ," p. 6A) As a result of this increase 
in income, there is a greater demand for goods. 
In addition, Argentina has a large middle class. 
It is this group that most companies target, and 
a large middle class means more profit oppor-
tunities for a corporation. (Whirlpool) 
All in all, foreign corporations have come 
to feel quite welcome in Argentina. The 
Foreign Investment Law of 1993 put foreign 
companies on equal footing with Argentine 
firms by allowing them to invest in the coun-
try without prior government approval. They 
have been permitted to enter the markets 
through the most convenient vehicle available, 
be it a merger, takeover, greenfield or joint ven-
ture. Companies are also no longer forced to 
disclose their profits, and no records need be 
kept. This lack of regulation makes it easy for 
a company to bring money back and forth from 
abroad. In addition, not having to pay any taxes 
on dividends provides another strong incentive 
to invest in the country. 
Although there are opportunities for all 
types of corporations in Argentina, there are 
two industries in particular which seem to be 
striving in the new economic environment: the 
durable goods and the foodstuffs industries. 
Two successful multinational corporations, 
Whirlpool and Nabisco, are examples of com-
panies from each industry which have benefit-
ted from expansion into Argentina. 
Whirlpool 
The durable goods industry, and in partic-
ular the appliance ( white goods ) sector, has 
experienced unparalleled growth in recent 
years. In 1991 production levels were at an 
unprecedented high, and expansion has con-
tinued. (Republica Argentina ... , 1993, p. 43) 
One of the reasons for the growth in this indus-
try is the increase in Argentine living standards. 
As the middle class has increased, the desire for 
housing has also grown. As the demand for 
housing increases, the demand for appliances 
also increases. Installment and credit plans 
have also made the purchase of durable goods 
more affordable. The Whirlpool Corporation is 
an excellent example of the large gains in prof-
it that multinational corporations have experi-
enced with the new Argentine economy. 
Worldwide, Whirlpool earns a two percent 
annual net return. Yet, in Argentina the cor-
poration enjoys a ten to fifteen percent return. 
Why is Whirlpool so much more successful in 
Argentina than in other parts of the world? 
Whirlpool executives attribute the region 's 
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higher returns to a lack of competition in the 
market. The company has also been an estab-
lished player in the market for quite some time 
and has been able to command higher profit 
margins on its products due to high consumer 
demand. Overall, the investment climate is 
quite ripe for corporate growth and for new 
players to be introduced on the market. In fact, 
General Electric, another well-known appliance 
company, is getting ready to enter the market 
and reap the rewards of the region. 
Nabisco 
The foodstuffs sector of Argentina is 
another industry which is poised for growth. 
Demand for its products has also been spurred 
by an increasing population and growth of the 
middle class. Nabisco International, a popular 
foodstuffs corporation, recently made a $250 
million investment in Argentina by purchasing 
the large Argentine biscuit company, Terrabusi. 
According to Kirk Elliotte , the director of 
strategic planning for Nabisco International, 
"With the opening of the economy and the 
Convertibility Plan, the Argentine economy 
became more attractive to international 
investors including Nabisco." He also cited the 
improved economy and higher standard of liv-
ing as other factors which he felt would prove 
beneficial to Nabisco 's presence in the · 
Argentine market. 
MERCOSUR 
In addition to all of the factors previously 
discussed, businesses are optimistic about 
MERCOSUR, a common market which began in 
January 1995. The participating countries of this 
agreement are Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, and 
Uruguay. The MERCOSUR treaty has three 
major provisions. The first is a trade liberaliza-
tion program which has eliminated many duties 
and tariff restrictions among the member coun-
tries. According to the second provision, the 
countries must coordinate their macroeconom-
ic policies to add some stability among their 
economies. Finally, the MERCOSUR countries 
have established agreements among their regions 
which will accelerate the integration process and 
optimize the use of production factors. 
MERCOSUR is expected to create a mar-
ket of 200 million inhabitants and an econom-
ic region with a GOP of close to one trillion dol-
lars. (Republica Argentina ... , 1994, p. 103) This 
agreement will be especially beneficial to 
Argentina because a large percentage of its 
trade is directed towards the other MERCOSUR 
countries. In fact, the percentage composition 
of interregional trade between Argentina and 
MERCOSUR members has increased from 17 
percent in 1990 to 26 percent in 1993. (Arthur 
Andersen, p. 27) Companies that move into 
Argentina will find that the span of their mar-
kets will be even greater, leading to larger prof-
it opportunities. 
Future Stability 
There is no doubt that Argentina is an 
excellent country for foreign investment and the 
multinational corporation. However, one must 
wonder whether the growth of the economy will 
be sustainable and if the regulations pertaining 
to foreign companies will continue to be as 
relaxed once enough capital is drawn into the 
country. Thanks to the Convertibility Plan, 
which has pegged the peso at a one-for-one 
exchange rate with the dollar and limits the gov-
ernment's control over seignorage, faith in the 
stability of the economy has remained quite 
strong. GOP is expected to continue growing at 
a rate of 4.5 to 6.5 percent per year. The gov-
ernment has also demonstrated a commitment 
to a stable economy by running a budget surplus 
for the past two years. ("The Foundations ... ," p. 
5) In addition, the growing popularity of pay-
ment plans and installment loans reflects the 
belief that inflation rates will continue to remain 
in check. 
The equal treatment of foreign corpora-
tions will continue to remain in effect because 
of the Argentine economy's reliance on foreign 
investment. The country has seen what restric-
tive policies can do and also knows the benefits 
that can be gained from an open economy. 
Closing its economy did nothing to increase 
production or give a competitive advantage to 
any of its industries. It only allowed the coun-
try to fall further behind the rest of the world. 
However, increasing accessibility to its markets 
has aided the economy. The growth in multi-
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national corporate investment has added jobs 
and has helped to increase technology transfer 
to Argentine companies. 
The recent currency and debt problems in 
Mexico have seriously dampened short-term 
growth prospects and investor confidence in 
many Latin American countries, including 
Argentina. Amidst speculation that the peso 
was overvalued and would soon be devalued, 
Finance Minister Jaime Serra Pouche went on 
record in December 1994 stating that there 
would be no change in peso policy. A few days 
later, however, he reversed the country's policy 
and widened the peso band, increasing the 
devaluation limit to 13.25 percent. Increasing 
the devaluation limit meant that the peso would 
be permitted to fluctuate to higher and lower 
values without the government interfering to 
support its value. The result was an immediate 
fall of 12.7 percent in the value of the Mexican 
peso. The devaluation was allowed because 
Mexico wanted to correct its large trade deficit 
which amounted to $17 billion for 1994. 
(Torres, "Headed South ... ," p. A1) By devaluing 
the peso, it was believed that exports would rise 
significantly as prices for Mexican goods abroad 
would decrease while imports at home would 
slow as the peso price increased. 
The Mexican devaluation was a severe blow 
to all the Latin American economies. 1\vo days 
after the devaluation, the Argentine stock mar-
ket fell 8 percent, and the Brazil market dropped 
6 percent. Investors, fearing that what hap-
pened in Mexico could occur elsewhere, pulled 
a lot of their money out of these markets. 
Why did this devaluation affect the rest of 
the Latin American economies, including 
Argentina, which had recently been praised for 
its economic stability and reforms? According 
to Argentina's Finance Minister, Domingo 
Cavallo, investors tend to view Latin American 
countries as one group rather than individual 
countries, because of their attempts at similar 
economic reforms. (Sims, p. 06) Argentina 
especially is often linked with Mexico since both 
have opened their economies to foreign invest-
ment and have aggressively privatized state 
industries. The two countries also have large 
current account deficits, making them reliant 
on outside capital flows. To attract the foreign 
capital needed, both countries have drawn 
investors to their markets with promises of sta-
ble exchange rates and economic growth. 
Still, there are several key factors which dif-
ferentiate Argentina from Mexico. Argentina's 
current account deficit is about half that of 
Mexico, while her international reserves are dou-
ble those of Mexico. (Sims, p. D6) In addition, 
the Currency Board of the Convertibility Plan 
ensures that the domestic money supply is com-
pletely backed by dollars. Mexico has no such 
system. As long as Argentina follows the dictates 
of the Convertibility Plan, it is unlikely that it 
will experience the same troubles as Mexico. The 
question is, will the country continue to stand 
by its Currency Board? Thus far, it appears that 
Argentina will not back down. Mr. Cavallo has 
stated that he would rather "dollarise" the econ-
omy (allow every peso to be converted into dol-
lars) than devalue the peso. Additionally, 85 per-
cent of the country is in agreement with Mr. 
Cavallo. ("The Foundations ... ," p. 5) 
While the Mexican debacle at the end of 
1994 has raised questions regarding the future 
stability of Argentina, most people feel confi-
dent that Argentina will remain a safe place for 
investments. Although most companies have 
scaled back their investments in Mexico, they 
are showing their confidence in Argentina by 
continuing with their investment plans. For 
example, Walmart continued with its plans to 
open six more stores in 1995, while cutting the 
number of new Mexican stores from thirty to 
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six. Fiat has invested $600 million to open its 
own Argentine factory. Other car companies 
such as Chrysler, General Motors, Toyota, and 
Renault have also expressed their optimism by 
announcing future investments in the country. 
(Friedland, p. A17) MERCOSUR has been said 
to be a strong motive in most corporations' 
investment decisions. 
Such investor optimism can be attributed 
to Argentina's apparent commitment to its 
Convertibility Plan. In a bold move to keep its 
currency stable, the government announced in 
mid-March of 1995 that it would choose to 
deflate its economy instead of devaluating the 
peso. Even the people agree that the country 
has too much to lose by devaluing. A March 
Economist poll showed that 85 percent of 
Argentines were against the devaluation of the 
peso. Because of the country's commitment to 
the Convertibility Plan, analysts expect the level 
of new foreign investment in 1995 in Argentina 
to equal that of 1994, about $1.5 billion. 
(Friedland, p. A17) 
Investors also attribute their willingness to 
keep their money in Argentina to MERCOSUR 
and the optimism of soaring trade growth with 
Brazil and the rest of Latin America. Thus, 
despite the uneasiness that has come about as a 
result of the Mexican crisis, investors still have 
faith that Argentina will ride out its problems and 
remain an excellent investment for the long term. 
REFERENCES 
"A Rough Ride." The Economist. March 11 , 1995. p. 71. 
Alexander, Robert J. Juan Domingo Peron: A History. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. 
Appleyard, Dennis and Alfred Field . International 
Economics. Chicago: Irwin, 1995. 
"Argentina's Currency Strengths." The Economist. January 
14, 1995, p. 68. 
Arthur Andersen. "Economic Trends In Argentina." 1994. 
Baldwin, Robert E. and J. David Richardson. International 
Trade and Finance. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 
1986. 
Bunge y Borne. Interview with G. Machi, J. Vazquez, and 
E. Stilrzenbaum, Buenos Aires, August 23, 1995. 
"Country Risk Rankings." Euromoney. September 1991. 
p. 172. 
"Country Risk Rankings." Euromoney. September 1994. 
p. 374. 
Doggart, Sebastian. Investment Opportunities in 
Argentina. The Southern Development Trust. 1991. 
Elliotte, Kirk. Interview, Nabisco International, February 
13, 1995. 
"The Foundations Have Been Laid. " The Economist. 
November 26, 1994, p. 5. 
Friedland, Jonathan. "Foreign Investors Bet on a Bright 
Future for Argentina Despite Recent Woes." Wall 
Street Journal. March 21 , 1995, p. A17. 
Gunter, Frank. "Country Risk. " The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Money and Finance. New York: 
Macmillan Press. 1992, pp. 506-509. 
Hannon, Paul. Argentina: A New Era. Euromoney 
Publications, London. 1993. 
Husted, Steven and Michael Melvin. International 
Economics. New York: Harper Collins, 1995. 
"Institutional Investor's 1991 Country Credit Rankings." 
Institutional!nvestor. October 1991. p. 244. 
"Institutional Investor's 1993 Country Credit Rankings." 
Institutional Investor. March 1993, p. 136. 
"Investors See Profits in Economic 'U-turn '." Journal of 
Commerce and Commercial. May 26, 1994, p. 6a. 
51 
Krugman , Paul and Maurice Obstfeld . International 
Economics: Theory and Policy. New York: Harper 
Collins, 1994. 
Lewis, Paul. The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. 
Moffer, Matt. "Taking a Huge Risk, Argentina Intentionally 
Deflates Its Economy." Wall Street Journal. March 
21, 1995, p.A1 
"Open Market Changes International Business Attitude." 
Journal of Commerce and Commercial. May 26, 
1994, p. 6a. 
Republica Argentina Ministerio de Economfa Y Obras Y 
Servicios Publicos. Argentina- A Growing Nation. 
1993. 
Republica Argentina Ministerio de Economfa Y Obras Y 
Servicios Publicos. Argentina- A Country for 
Investment and Growth. 1994. 
Rock, David. Argentina 1516-1987. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1987. 
Sims, Calvin. "Argentina Strives to Regain Confidence." 
New York Times. January 12, 1995, p. D6. 
Torres, Craig. "Mexico Reverses Currency Policy; Peso Falls 
12.7%." Wall Street Journal. December 21 , 1994, 
p.A3. 
Torres, Craig. "Headed South: Peso Devaluation by Mexico 
Stuns Latin America. " Wall Street Journal. 
December 22, 1994, p. Al. 
U.S. Embassy. "1994 Investment Climate Statement." 
U.S. Embassy. "Economic Trends Report." 
"U.S. , Foreign Firms Invest Millions in Argentina's Food, 
Farm Sector." Journal of Commerce and Commercial. 
May 18, 1994, p. 7a. 
Whirlpool Corporation Argentina. Interview. August 24, 
1995. 
"Why the Argentine Peso Should Continue to Be Stable." 
Oppenheimer & Co., Inc. July 26, 1994. 
